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NOTES
Compensating Manufacturers Submitting Health and
Safety Data to Support Product Registrations After
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto
Congress regulates chemical products marketed in the United States to
ensure that they are safe and effective for the people who use them and not
harmful to the human and natural environments.' A major concern of
Congress is to develop adequate information on product safety and effec-
tiveness to enable government decision-makers to make appropriate regu-
latory decisions and to assist the public to make informed purchases.2 Chemical
substances are pervasive in the United States, and include such common
products as drugs, cosmetics, insecticides, and food additives.3 Since regu-
lation of these products has been achieved through piecemeal regulatory
actions aimed at particular industries, the regulations sometimes treat similar
products inconsistently.
Congress has addressed the need for adequate information about various
kinds of chemical products in three ways: by appropriating government
money for research 4 by requesting a particular federal agency to conduct
the research,' and by requiring industry to develop adequate data by placing
on it the burden of determining whether a product is safe and effective. 6
Shifting the burden to industry has economic and social advantages. With
such a program, product manufacturers develop health and safety data on
a product before placing the product on the market; manufacturers expedite
I. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 136a (1982) (FIFRA); 15 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1) (1982) (TSCA); 21
U.S.C. § 355(b) (1982) (new drugs); 21 U.S.C. § 360b (1982) (new animal drugs); 21 U.S.C.
§ 348 (1982) (food additives); 21 U.S.C. § 376 (1982) (color additives); 21 U.S.C. § 357 (1982)
(antibiotics).
2. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(2)(A) (1982) (FIFRA); 15 U.S.C.§ 2609 (1982) (TSCA).
The recent disaster in Bhopal, India, reinforces society's need to have adequate information
about the health effects of industrial chemicals. The chemical involved in the Bhopal accident,
methyl isocyanate, was responsible for injuring or killing more than 200,000 people. Workers
on duty at the time of the accident believed the chemical was harmful only as an eye irritant.
N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1985, at 6, col. 2 (midwest edition).
3. See infra notes 90-172 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 136r (1982) (FIFRA); 15 U.S.C. § 2609(a) (1982) (TSCA); 15
U.S.C. § 2054(c) (1982) (Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972).
5. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 136r (1982); 15 U.S.C. § 2609(a) (1982); 15 U.S.C. § 2054(a)(2)
(1982) (directing the Consumer Product Safety Commission to "conduct such continuing studies
and investigations of deaths, injuries, diseases, other health impairments, and economic losses
resulting from accidents involving consumer products").
6. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 136a (1982); 15 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1) (1982).
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the development of data in order to market the product as soon as possible;
and manufacturers develop data only for those products with market po-
tential. A company may not market a product until it submits adequate
health and safety data for the product to the appropriate regulatory agency.
Once submitted, the health and safety data can be made available to the
public either through a specific disclosure provision in the statute or through
the general disclosure provision of the Freedom of Information Act.7 Prob-
lems are created, however, when companies in competition with the submitter
obtain the data through a public disclosure provision or use the data to
obtain permission from the regulatory agency to market the product them-
selves. Although manufacturing processes and product formulae can be
protected when health and safety data are disclosed, 8 free riders may avoid
the substantial costs of developing health and safety data as well as the risks
inherent in marketing a new product.9
Regulations requiring companies to develop health and safety data before
marketing a product attempt to prevent free-rider problems. 0 Contradictory
7. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (1982). Congress enacted the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA")
to make available to the public information held by the federal government. Id. The FOIA exempts
certain things from disclosure, including "trade secrets and commercial or financial information
obtained from a person and privileged or confidential." Id. § 552(b)(4). It has been noted,
however, that "absent specific statutory language to the contrary, agency regulations generally
have uncritically labeled health and safety data as proprietary and thus exempted such infor-
mation from disclosure under the [FOIA]." McGarity & Shapiro, The Trade Secret Status of
Health and Safety Information, 93 HARV. L. REV. 837, 838 (1980). In Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,
441 U.S. 281 (1979), the Supreme Court held that federal agencies have some power to release
information within a FOIA exemption. The Court said, "in order for such regulations to have
the 'force and effect of law,' it is necessary to establish a nexus between the regulations and
some delegation of the requisite legislative authority by Congress." Id. at 304. Later in the
opinion, the Court explained that "[tihis is not to say that any grant of legislative authority
to a federal agency by Congress must be specific before regulations promulgated pursuant to
it can be binding on courts in a manner akin to statutes. What is important is that the reviewing
court reasonably be able to conclude that the grant of authority contemplates the regulations
issued." Id. at 308.
8. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 136h(d)(1) (1982) (FIFRA); 15 U.S.C. § 2613(b) (1982) (TSCA);
21 U.S.C. § 71.15a(h)(2)(i) (1982) (food additives); 21 U.S.C. § 171.1(h)(2)(i) (1982) (color
additives); 21 U.S.C. § 431.71(0(1) (1982) (antibiotics); 21 U.S.C. § 601.51(0(1) (1982) (bio-
logical products).
9. The average cost of health and safety data for a new drug has been estimated to be
between $2.7 and $4.7 million. Clymer, The Economics of Drug Innovation, in THE DEVEL-
OPMENT AND CONTROL OF NEw DRUG PRODUCTS 112 (1971), quoted in McGarity & Shapiro,
supra note 7, at 849. For pesticides, the average cost of health and safety data has been
estimated at between $5 and $7 million. S. REP. No. 334, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 30 (1977),
cited in McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 7, at 849. One author has said, "the barriers to
entering the market are the large capital investment required for manufacturing facilities, the
large cash reserves necessary either to purchase patent licenses or to sort through a large number
of chemicals looking for a suitable pesticide, and the network of salesman to distribute the
product. Regulatory requirements are also a barrier to entering the market, but if all the
regulatory requirements disappeared, it would still be impossible for a small firm to get into
the pesticide manufacturing business." Davies, The Effect of Federal Regulation on Chemical
Industry Innovation, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 41, 46-47 (1983).
10. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
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policy goals within a single regulation have, however, often resulted in
inadequate protection of the original data submitter. To bolster their posi-
tion, original data submitters argued that the health and safety data they
produced to support a product registration were "trade secrets" which, as
property, should be paid for when "taken" by the government." In a recent
decision, Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto,'2 the United States Supreme Court agreed
with this position, holding that just compensation is required under the
taking clause of the fifth amendment when the government appropriates
health and safety data after having explicitly assured the submitter at the
time of submission that the data would not be used for any purpose other
than those specifically mentioned in the regulation. 13 The Monsanto decision,
however, leaves many questions unanswered, including what constitutes "just
compensation" for use of data, and how the ruling may apply to other
data-reporting regulations.
This Note begins by examining the Monsanto decision and the Supreme
Court's approach to determining whether data disclosure and use constitute
a "taking." 4 The Note then examines several statutory approaches to com-
11. See infra note 54. The Restatement defines trade secrets as "any formula, pattern,
device or compilation of information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an
opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment
b (1939). This definition, which would include health and safety data, is a change from the
common law position. See Public Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA, 704 F.2d 1280, 1286
(D.C. Cir. 1983); McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 7 at 863; Connelly, Secrets and Smokescreens:
A Legal and Economic Analysis of Government Disclosures of Business Data, 1981 Wis. L.
REV. 207, 230. Some courts have restricted trade secret protection to the production process
itself, including any "unpatented, secret, commercially valuable plan, appliance, formula, or
process which is used for the making, preparing, compounding, treating, or processing of
articles or materials which are trade commodities." U.S. ex rel. Norwegian Nitrogen Prods.
Co. v. United States Tariff Comm'n, 6 F.2d 491, 495 (D.C. Cir. 1925). Even if not a trade
secret, health and safety data has been protected as confidential commercial information under
exemption four of the FOIA. 704 F.2d at 1290. See also National Parks and Conservation Ass'n
v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 766 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See generally Annot., 21 A.L.R. FED. 224
(1974).
12. 104 S. Ct. 2862 (1984).
13. Id. at 2875. The decision explicitly overruled the dicta of Justice Holmes in E.I. duPont
de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100 (1917). Justice Holmes said in that case,
"[t]he word 'property' as applied to trade-marks and trade secrets is an unanalyzed expression
of certain secondary consequences of the primary fact that the law makes some rudimentary
requirements of good faith. Whether the plaintiffs have any valuable secret or not the defendant
knows the facts, whatever they are, through a special confidence he accepted. The property
may be denied but the confidence cannot be." Id. at 102.
14. This Note assumes that the benefits gained by public disclosure outweigh any incon-
venience to individual companies. For an excellent discussion of the policies for and against
disclosure, see McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 7, at 839-857. The problem was summarized
as follows:
Disclosure may, for example, reduce the incentives for new product research and
development by preventing companies from fully recouping the high cost of
generating the required test data, and by making it easier for competitors to duplicate
and license breakthroughs. Nondisclosure, on the other hand, may hamper scien-
tific progress, deny consumers the opportunity to make fully informed product
use decisions, increase the risks that agency decisions based on faulty data or analysis
1986]
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pensation, including the exclusive-use period authorized by the Federal In-
secticide, Fungicide, Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA") and the compensation
schemes set up in FIFRA and the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976
("TSCA"). The Note concludes by proposing a cost-sharing program that
allows an originator of data to receive compensation based on the number
of subsequent manufacturers who wish to market the product. A cost-sharing
program relieves the original data submitter of the burden of solely paying
for health and safety data for competitive products, while remaining con-
sistent with the philosophy that the cost of developing health and safety
data should be a necessary cost of marketing a product.
I. COMPENSATION UNDER THE TAKING CLAUSE
A. The Supreme Court's Decision in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto
One way to compensate a company for submitting health and safety data
in order to obtain a registration to market a product is to identify the data
as a trade secret or some other property interest. Under the taking clause
of the fifth amendment, any taking of private property by the government
for a public purpose requires "just compensation."' 5 Trade secrets have not,
however, always been considered property. State law first began protecting
trade secrets to prevent discovery of manufacturing processes and formulae
by "improper means," including breaches of confidence by former employees
and others.' 6 Although intended to maintain such standards of commercial
ethics, trade secret protection also encouraged inventiveness. 7 State trade
secret law, therefore, supplemented the protection provided by patent and
copyright law.'8 As trade secret law developed, some states began to recognize
will remain undiscovered, and encourage potentially hazardous duplicate human
testing.
Id. at 838. See also REviEw PANEL ON NEW DRUG REGULATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HaLTH, EDUCATION,
AND WELFARE, INTERIM REPORT, AN EVALUATION OF FDA's TRADE SECRET AND FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION POLICIES (November 15, 1976) [hereinafter cited as REVIEW PANEL].
15. "No person shall be ... deprived of ... property, without due process of law; nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend.
V. " 'Taking' is, of course, constitutional law's expression for any sort of publicly inflicted
private injury for which the Constitution requires payment of compensation." Michelman,
Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of 'Just Compensation'
Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1165 (1967).
16. See 4 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757(a), (b) (1939).
17. If a company can keep a successful commercial product or process secret, it is able to
keep the product or process from its competitors, and thereby reap monopolistic profits by
being the sole company manufacturing the product or using the process.
18. The Supreme Court has held that state trade secret law is not preempted by federal
patent law. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974). The Court did not
fear that extending trade secret protection to clearly patentable innovations would undermine
the disclosure policy of patent law, reasoning that trade secret law "provides for weaker
protection in many respects from the patent law." Id. at 489-90.
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that trade secrets deserved protection as property because of their similarity
to other forms of intangible property.' 9
In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto,2" the Supreme Court decided for the first time
that trade secrets could be considered property if state law made them so.
Monsanto manufactured various chemical products subject to the registration
requirements of FIFRA. 21 FIFRA requires companies seeking to market a
product in the United States to submit adequate health and safety data on
the product in order to obtain a registration for the product.2 2 A company
may not market a product in the United States unless it obtains a regis-
tration.23 Subsequent applicants intending to market the same product may,
however, rely on the first applicant's health and safety data in certain
circumstances. 24 In addition, the health and safety data can be made available
to interested parties through a data-disclosure provision in the statute. 25
Monsanto argued that disclosure of the data to the public and use of the
data by subsequent applicants were unconstitutional under the taking clause, 26
and that the use of the data to support product registrations for subsequent
applicants amounted to a taking for a private rather than a public purpose. 27
The Supreme Court unanimously agreed that trade secrets, like certain
other intangible property, are "deserving of the protection of the Taking
Clause." ' 2 The Court went on to say that health and safety data are protected
by the taking clause of the fifth amendment as long as state law recognizes
the data as a trade secret. 29 The Court had more trouble deciding whether
government use of health and safety data amounts to a taking. Three factors
19. 1 MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS § 1.01[2]. See also Note, Constitutional Limitations on
Government Disclosure of Private Trade Secret Information, 56 IND. L.J. 347, 357 n.56 (1981).
20. 104 S. Ct. 2862 (1984).
21. The district court found that Monsanto had spent in excess of $23.6 million in developing
the health, safety and environmental data necessary to obtain product registrations under FIFRA.
564 F. Supp. 552, 560 (E.D. Mo. 1983).
22. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(2)(A) (Supp. 1985).
23. Id.
24. See infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
25. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(l)(D)(ii) (Supp. 1985).
26. Monsanto, 104 S. Ct. at 2873.
27. Id. at 2879. The Court refused to rule that using submitted data for purposes of the
data consideration provision of FIFRA amounted to use for a private rather than a public
purpose. Id. at 2880. Although recognizing that the most direct beneficiaries of the data
consideration provision were subsequent applicants, the Court believed that Congress had public
purposes in mind when it passed the provision, finding "Congress believed that the provisions
would eliminate costly duplication of research and streamline the registration process, making
new end-use products available to consumers more quickly." Id. at 2879. This deference to
congressional opinion as to what is in the public interest is consistent with recent decisions by
the Court dealing with takings that have shown increasing liberality in determining what
constitutes a public use. See, e.g., Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. 2341 (1984); Berman
v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1957) ("[w]hen the legislature has spoken, the public interest has
been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive").
28. Monsanto, 104 S. Ct. at 2873.
29. Id. at 2874.
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necessary to determine whether a taking has occurred were outlined in a
previous case.3 ' Those factors were 'the character of the governmental
action, its economic impact, and its interference with reasonable investment-
backed expectations.' "3, The Court emphasized that its previous decisions
had shown that no "set formula" exists by which to determine whether a
governmental action amounted to a taking, and that such a determination
was 'essentially an ad hoc, factual' inquiry." ' 32 The Court, nevertheless,
found the factor of "reasonable investment-backed expectations" to be
dispositive of the taking question. 3
FIFRA was first adopted in 194734 and has been amended several times
during its history. The Court examined three time periods during the Act's
lifespan in order to determine whether Monsanto had a reasonable invest-
ment-backed expectation concerning its data during the three primary ver-
sions of FIFRA.33
FIFRA was intended to be a licensing and labelling statute when it was
first enacted. 6 Although the Secretary of Agriculture could require an ap-
plicant to support the claims it made on a product label by submitting test
data, 37 the statute was silent before 1972 as to the authority of the government
to use or disclose the submitted data. The United States Department of
Agriculture ("USDA"), however, instituted a policy of not disclosing data
submitted in support of a product registration. 38 In addition, the district
30. The three factor test was originally set out in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). See also Kaiser Aetna Co. v. United States, 444 U.S. 164,
175 (1979).
31. Monsanto, 104 S. Ct. at 2875 (quoting PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robbins, 447
U.S. 74, 83 (1980)).
32. Monsanto, 104 S. Ct. at 2874 (citations omitted).
33. Id. at 4891 (" [We find that the force of this factor is so overwhelming, at least with respect
to certain of the data submitted by Monsanto to EPA, that it disposes of the taking question
regarding that data.").
34. Pub. L. No. 80-121, 61 Stat. 163 (1947).
35. The three periods were from 1947 to October 21, 1972, October 22, 1972 to September
30, 1978, and November 1, 1978 to the present. The Court did not consider the FIFRA amend-
ments of 1975. Although not affecting the preexisting compensation system, the 1975 amend-
ments did clarify that the compensation requirement applied only to data submitted after January
1, 1970, and to subsequent applications filed after October 21, 1972. Pub. L. No. 94-140,
§ 12, 89 Stat. 751, 755 (1975).
36. Pub. L. No. 80-121, §§ 3(a), 4(a), 61 Stat. 166-67 (1947).
37. Id. § 4(a), (b). In 1970, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) replaced the United
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) as the agency in charge of administering pesticide
registrations under FIFRA. No real change in administration philosophy occurred at that time.
See Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,623, 15,624 (1970).
38. Under the pre-1972 regulatory scheme, manufacturing processes and formulae were
explicitly protected. 7 U.S.C. § 135(b), (c) (1964) (superseded 1972). In addition, the USDA,
the agency responsible for administering FIFRA from its birth in 1947 to 1970, had instituted
a policy of not disclosing data submitted in support of a product registration. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R.
§ 1.4(b)(15) (1962); 7 C.F.R. § 370.13(d) (1968).
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court in Monsanto found that it was not the policy of the Department of
Agriculture to use the data to support a subsequent applicant's registration
of the same or a similar product.3 9 The Supreme Court found nevertheless
that the initial data submitters, prior to 1972, did not have a "reasonable
expectation that the [USDA] or [EPA] would not use the data it had submit-
ted when evaluating the application of another.""' The Court reasoned that
there had been no finding that the policies of the EPA or the USDA were
"publicly known" or that Monsanto had ever been given an explicit guarantee
that the data it submitted prior to 1972 would only be used to support its
product registration."
Equally unpersuasive to the Court was Monsanto's argument that the
Federal Trade Secrets Act, passed in 1948, prevented the government from
using or disclosing its health and safety data.42 The Trade Secrets Act
prohibits an employee of the federal government from disclosing, in any
way not authorized, any trade secret information he happens to come across
during the course of his official duties. Any federal employee disclosing or
in any way profiting from a trade secret risks fine and imprisonment.43 The
Court did not believe, however, that the Act was a guarantee of confiden-
tiality or sufficient to be an "express promise" that the data would not be
used for purposes other than obtaining a product registration for the original
submitter.4
Congress amended FIFRA substantially in 1972.45 The 1972 amendments
mandated that certain test data be produced and submitted to the EPA
39. 564 F. Supp. at 564. The Supreme Court in Monsanto disagreed with the district court,
saying that "[a]lthough the evidence against the District Court's finding seems overwhelming,
we need not determine that the finding was clearly erroneous in order to find that a submitter
had no reasonable expectation that the [USDA] or EPA would not use the data it had submitted
when evaluating the application of another. The District Court did not find that the policy of
the Department was publicly known at the time or that there was any explicit guarantee of
exclusive use." 104 S. Ct. at 2877 n.14.
40. Monsanto, 104 S. Ct. at 2877 n.14.
41. Id. The Supreme Court did not go into detail to help illuminate when a policy of a
government agency would be "publicly known," or whether a policy that is publicly known
but not explicitly set out in a regulation or statute could ever be the basis of a "reasonable
investment-backed expectation."
42. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1982) ("Whoever ... publishes, divulges, discloses, or makes known
in any manner or to any extent not authorized by law any information coming to him in the
course of his employment or official duties ... which information concerns or relates to the
trade secrets, processes, operations, style of work, or apparatus, or to the identity, confidential
statistical data, amount or source of any income, profits, losses, or expenditures of any person
... shall be fined not more than $1000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.").
43. Id.
44. Monsanto, 104 S. Ct. at 2876. Justice O'Connor, dissenting in part, disagreed with the
Court's assessment of the Trade Secrets Act, saying "[ilt seems to me that the criminal sanctions
in the Trade Secrets Act therefore created at least as strong an expectation of privacy before
1972 as the precatory language of § 10 created after 1972." Id. at 2884.
45. FIFRA was amended by the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, Pub.
L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 973 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 1972 Amendments].
19861
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
before a product could be used, shipped or marketed in the United States.16
The amendments also specifically addressed the question of use and disclosure
of data obtained through the pesticide registration procedure. 47 Any health,
safety or environmental data submitted on a product could be disclosed to
the public.48 The EPA could also use any of the submitted data in considering
the application of a subsequent applicant, provided that the later applicant
payed the original submitter "reasonable compensation. ' 49 Compensation
was only required of subsequent applicants who wished to use the original
applicant's data to support a registration within fifteen years of the original
submission. If the two companies could not agree on an amount, the matter
was submitted to the EPA for determination.5 0 Under the 1972 amendments,
however, the EPA was explicitly prohibited from using or disclosing any
trade secrets of the original data submitter 1 A data submitter could designate
any portions of its data as a trade secret. Since the amendments did not
define what the term "trade secret" was to encompass, submitting companies
designated all health and safety data as trade secrets. 52 Between 1972 and
1978, the year FIFRA was again amended explicitly to exclude health and
safety data from the trade secret exemption, 3 the question whether health
and safety data could be trade secret material was litigated frequently.5 4
The Monsanto Court found that the trade secret exemption of the 1972
amendments provided Monsanto and similarly situated companies an "ex-
plicit governmental guarantee" sufficient to warrant a reasonable investment-
backed expectation that data marked "trade secret" and submitted to support
a product registration would not be used or disseminated without permis-
sion.55 Data submitters during this period, however, may have had less
assurance that their data would remain inviolate with the EPA than the
46. The amendment specifically required manufacturers to show that a pesticide would not
cause "unreasonable adverse effects on the environment." Id. § 3(c)(5)(C), (D).
47. Id. § 10(a)-(c).
48. See id. § 10.
49. Id. § 3(c)(1)(D).
50. Id. The Administrator's decision could be reviewed judicially upon the instigation of
the original data submitter.
51. Id. § 10(a).
52. 7 U.S.C. § 136h(c) (1982) required the EPA to give a manufacturer 30-days notice
before it released the manufacturer's health and safety data designated as trade secrets. The
EPA did not determine whether the manufacturer's designation of data as a "trade secret"
was valid until a request for the data was made. If the EPA proposed to disclose the data
over the original submitter's objection, the original submitter was authorized to institute a
declaratory judgment action in a federal district court. 1972 Amendments, supra note 45, § 10(c).
53. Pub. L. No. 95-396, 92 Stat. 819 (1978).
54. See, e.g., Mobay Chem. Co. v. Gorsuch, 682 F.2d 419 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
988 (1982); Chevron Chem. Co. v. Costle, 641 F.2d 104 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961
(1981); Amchem Prods. Co. v. Costle, 594 F.2d 470, modified, 602 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1979);
Petrolite Corp. v. EPA, 519 F. Supp. 966 (D.D.C. 1981).
55. 104 S. Ct. at 2878. The Court relied on the definition of trade secrets that appears in
the Restatement of Torts. See supra note 11.
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Supreme Court believed. The 1972 amendments explicitly protected trade
secrets, not health and safety data. The EPA believed that no test data were
entitled to confidential treatment unless they revealed manufacturing proc-
esses or formulae.5 6 The fact that the issue was litigated extensively with
inconsistent outcomes in different courts belies the assertion that the data
submitters during this period had any "reasonable" expectations at all.5 7
The 1978 amendments to FIFRA explicitly excluded health and safety data
from the trade secret exemption. 8 Congress attempted to placate original
data submitters by providing additional limitations on the use of data sub-
mitted to support product registrations. The amended Act provided that the
EPA could not use the data to support a subsequent company's registration
of a product without the permission of the original data submitter for a
period of ten years from the date of submission. 59 The original data submitter
was entitled to an offer of compensation from subsequent applicants that
wished to use its data during the five-year period after the ten-year exclusive
time. 6° Since the 1978 amendments made clear the EPA's authority to use
and disclose the data, the Monsanto Court found that no data submitter
could have had a reasonable investment-backed expectation concerning data
submitted after 1978. The Court stated that "as long as Monsanto is aware
of the conditions under which the data are submitted, and the conditions
are rationally related to a legitimate government interest, a voluntary sub-
mission of data by an applicant in exchange for the economic advantages
of a registration can hardly be called a taking." 61 In a footnote, the Court
reasoned that Monsanto could always forego registering its products in the
United States and instead sell only in foreign markets. 62
The Monsanto case involved determining whether a regulation was in fact
a compensable taking. 63 Justice Holmes anticipated some of the problems
56. See, e.g., Chevron Chem. Co. v. Costle, 443 F. Supp. 1024, 1026 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
57. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
58. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(D) (1982) (data use provision); 7 U.S.C. § 136h(b)
(1982) (release to other federal agencies and at public hearings); 7 U.S.C. § 136h(d) (1982)
(disclosure to the public); 7 U.S.C. § 136h(e) (1982) (disclosure to contractors).
59. 1972 Amendments, supra note 45, § 3(c)(I)(D)(i).
60. Id. § 3(c)(1)(D)(iii).
61. Monsanto, 104 S. Ct. at 2876 (borrowing reasoning from Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v.
Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 555 F.2d 82 (3d Cir. 1977)). The Supreme Court explicitly rejected
the argument that requiring a submitter of data to give up its property interest was an
"unconstitutional condition on the right to a valuable government benefit." 104 S. Ct. at 2875.
62. Monsanto, 104 S. Ct. 2876 n.l1.
63. Through the commerce clause, the federal government regulates interstate commerce to
promote health, safety and general public good. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. The power of eminent
domain allows the government to appropriate private property for a public use upon payment
of "just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. Although traditionally "viewed as operating
within separate ambits," regulations under the commerce clause sometimes affect property
interests as much as direct takings under the taking clause. Gannon, FIFRA and The Taking
of Trade Secrets, 8 B.C. EVrVL. L. REv. 593, 611 (1980). One author has noted that "[w]here
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that occur when regulations approach takings in their effects in his famous
majority opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.64 Justice Holmes
explained there that the real problem in evaluating whether a taking of
property has occurred is determining "upon whom the loss of the changes
desired should fall." ' 65 This is the same analysis underlying tort law.'6 Ap-
plying a tort analysis to the FIFRA regulations to evaluate whether the same
result would have been achieved had the Court not focused on the investment-
backed expectations of Monsanto is therefore appropriate. 6
Congress was serving the public interest in enacting the FIFRA data
reporting requirement.6 8 Monsanto and other data submitters benefit from
the regulation as much as private citizens. 69 The Supreme Court had in fact,
prior to Monsanto, upheld regulations that affected interests in data in ways
similar to the FIFRA data reporting requirements. In fact, the Court quoted
from one of these cases, Corn Products Refining Co. v. Eddy,70 in its
regulation ends and 'taking' begins has been an important factor in a number of 'taking'
cases." 1d. at 610. See also Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928), quoted
in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 125 (1978) ("[l]n instances in
which a state tribunal reasonably concluded that the 'health, safety, morals or general welfare'
would be promoted by prohibiting particular contemplated uses of land, this Court has upheld
land use regulations that destroyed or adversely affected recognized real property interests.");
Michelman, supra note 15, at 1192.
64. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
65. Id. at 416. See also L. TRIBE, AMuCAN CoNsrrrunoNAL LAW § 9-4, at 464 (1978)
(presenting the problem as a "choice between (1) leaving the harm where the government action
initially imposed it, and (2) taking steps to spread the harm more widely or at least differently.").
66. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 50 (1964).
67. The expectation of property owners may be the major concern of the current members
of the Supreme Court. The Court has not, however, abandoned the other factors entirely. In
Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985), the
Court said, "this Court consistently has indicated that among the factors of particular
significance in the inquiry are the economic impact of the challenged action and the extent to
which it interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations." Id. at 3119 (emphasis added).
Focusing solely on the expectations of property owners in other takings contexts leads to
absurd results unintended by the Court's position in Monsanto. Such an emphasis may, for
example, lead to the invalidation of some prospective zoning or historic designation ordinances
simply because a landowner buys for one purpose but fails to build before a new ordinance
is enacted that makes the intended use impermissible. By focusing on one "factor" over others
in a particular takings dispute, the Court increases uncertainty and prevents predictability in
the takings area generally.
68. "[lI]t is not a tort for government to govern." Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15,
57 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
69. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262 (1980) ("The zoning ordinances
benefit the appellants as well as the public by serving the city's interest in assuring careful and
orderly development of residential property with provision for open space."); Penn Central,
438 U.S. at 134-35 ("Unless we are to reject the judgement of the New York City Council
that the preservation of landmarks benefits all New York citizens and all structures, both
economically and by improving the quality of life in the city as a whole-which we are unwilling
to do-we cannot conclude that the owners of the terminal have in no sense been benefited
by the Landmarks Law.").
70. 249 U.S. 427 (1919).
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discussion in Monsanto of FIFRA's post-1978 data reporting requirement. 7
Corn Products involved a Kansas law that required manufacturers to label
the percentages of ingredients in syrup. The petitioner alleged that such
information was held as a trade secret and that the regulation amounted
"to a taking of its property without due process of law." 7 2 The Court held
that "[t]he rights of a manufacturer to maintain secrecy as to his compounds
and processes must be held subject to the right of the State, in the exercise
of its police power and in promotion of fair dealing, to require that the
nature of the product be fairly set forth. ' 73
Monsanto, on the other hand, can be seen as creating the risk that
prompted the regulation. A "creation of the harm" or "noxious use" test
was first introduced by the Supreme Court in holding railroads responsible
for the costs of building grade separations necessitated by the fear of ac-
cidents where trains intersected public highways. 74 The Court reasoned in
those cases that "[h]aving brought about the problem, the railroads are in
no position to complain because their share in the cost of alleviating it is
not based solely on the special benefits accruing to them from the improve-
ments." ' 75 Like the railroads, the chemical industry presents special risks to
society even though it plays an essential role in the economy.
Although the Supreme Court in Monsanto required the government to
pay just compensation under the taking clause for health and safety data
used to support a subsequent registration between 1972 and 1978, the Court
did not delineate what would constitute adequate compensation under the
taking clause. The Court refused to find that any taking had occurred before
arbitration under the statutory compensation scheme had taken place: "We
cannot preclude the possibility that the arbitration award will be sufficient
to provide Monsanto with just compensation. " 76 This wait-and-see approach
has several disadvantages. First, it delays the award of compensation until
after the fifteen-year statutory period of mandatory compensation. For those
71. 104 S. Ct. at 2876.
72. Corn Products, 249 U.S. at 431.
73. Id. at 431-32. See also National Fertilizer Ass'n v. Bradley, 301 U.S. 178 (1937)(reaffirming Corn Products in a case involving a South Carolina statute requiring labelling of
fertilizer bags). These cases, while going beyond FIFRA in that they require manufacturing
formulae to be disclosed, can be distinguished from FIFRA since they involved information
that was already available to the manufacturer.
74. See, e.g., Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 346 U.S. 346(1953); Nashville, Chattanooga and St. Louis Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405 (1935); see generally
Sax, supra note 66, at 48-50.
75. Atchison, 346 U.S. at 353.
76. Monsanto, 104 S. Ct. at 2878-79 n.16. Implicit in the Court's analysis is the belief that
destroying the exclusive use, rather than "taking" the data, is central to the question of
compensation. The Court recognized that Monsanto may still use its data "as bases from which
to develop new products or refine old products, as marketing and advertising tools, or as
information necessary to obtain registration in foreign countries." Id. at 2878. See also Note,
supra note 19, at 368; Gannon, supra note 63, at 605.
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companies that submitted data in 1978-the last year of the "explicit gov-
ernmental guarantee" of confidentiality for trade secrets-it could be as late
as 1993 before they can seek compensation. Second, since it is nowhere
made explicit what constitutes "just compensation" for the "taking" of
health and safety data, additional litigation will be required after the statutory
compensation mechanism has run its course to determine what compensation
is appropriate to satisfy the taking clause. By enacting the compensation
scheme, Congress intended to reduce the amount of work for the courts,
not to create additional burdens for them. 77 Finally, relying on the statutory
arbitration method for determining the appropriate level of compensation
focuses on the value of the health and safety data rather than the "secrecy"
that is lost. What has been "taken" by a regulation allowing an agency to
use data submitted to support one product registration to support the ap-
plications of subsequent companies is the exclusivity of the data, rather than
the data itself.78
B. Compensation for "Takings" of Trade Secrets
The Monsanto Court distinguished between the right given in the statute
to obtain compensation from a subsequent applicant who relies on the
original data to register a product, and the right under the Constitution to
"just compensation." The Court explained that "[e]xhaustion of the sta-
tutory remedy is necessary to determine the extent of the taking that has
occurred. To the extent that the operation of the statute provides compen-
sation, no taking has occurred and the original submitter of data has no
claim against the Government." 79 The question of what, in addition to the
statutory compensation, may be necessary to compensate the original sub-
mitter of data to satisfy the taking clause was not addressed by the Court."'
77. See supra text accompanying note 7.
78. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. If no subsequent applicant requests to use
the data to support a product registration, the original submitter receives no compensation.
The data may still have been revealed through the public disclosure provision. The Supreme
Court's standard, therefore, is anomalous because the use to which the property is put is the
key to determining whether compensation is required, rather than whether a "taking" has
occurred in the first instance.
In Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1978), the Court
legitimized a New York City landmark law that prevented the owners of the Grand Central
Terminal from adding additional stories above the terminal or changing the terminal's facade.
Although the present use of the terminal brought the owners a "reasonable return," they could
not use the property exclusively. While the exclusivity of trade secrets has greater historical
foundation, no theoretical difference exists between the exclusive use of trade secrets and the
exclusive use of land, as long as some use of the secret remains after the taking.
79. Monsanto, 104 S. Ct. at 2881 n.21.
80. But cf. Monsanto Co. v. EPA, 552 F. Supp. 552, 568 (1981).
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In a typical takings case involving real property, the measure of damages
is the market value of the property appropriated by the government.' For
the most part, the market value approach satisfies the policy of paying the
owner "the full and perfect equivalent in money of the property taken. '8 2
In some cases, however, the Supreme Court has recognized that compensation
as determined by the market value gives an inappropriate measure of the
actual value. 83 The actual value of a trade secret, for instance, cannot be
determined by looking to a market value since its value is not determined
in the market.84 As the Court said in Monsanto, "[t]he economic value of
that property right lies in the competitive advantage over others that Mon-
santo enjoys by virtue of its exclusive access to the data, and disclosure or
use by others of the data would destroy that competitive edge." 85
A situation analogous to the taking of trade secrets exists when the gov-
ernment takes the fee simple interest in a private roadway, forcing the owner
or an exclusive easement holder to share the road with the public. The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals has determined in several cases that a market value
approach is inappropriate in this situation, since the party subject to the
taking can still use the roadway 6 That court has awarded damages based
on the theory that the exclusive use of the roadway was itself a property
right which had been taken. In each case, however, the value of the exclusive
use was left as a matter of proof to be determined by the trial court.8 7
The Supreme Court has found in another taking context that "[i]t is not
fair that the government be required to pay the enhanced price which its
demand alone has created." 88 The extent, therefore, that the value of the
exclusive use of data is enhanced because of the requirement that data be
submitted to support a product registration should probably be discounted
when determining the appropriate level of compensation to satisfy the taking
clause. In some cases, the registration requirement may provide the only real
value to using the data "exclusively." However, since other manufacturers,
rather than the government, compensate for the "taking" of the data in
this context, the Court's prior concern over passing the cost of enhanced
81. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 379 (1945); see generally
Annot., 11 A.L.R.4TH 12 (1982); Annot., 19 L. Ed. 2d 1361 (1968).
82. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373 (1943).
83. General Motors, 323 U.S. at 379.
84. See generally Johnson, Remedies in Trade Secret Litigation, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 1004
(1978).
85. 104 S. Ct. at 2878. Even so, the data remains valuable to the original submitter after
it is submitted. See supra note 76.
86. See United States v. 10.0 Acres of Land, 533 F.2d 1092 (9th Cir. 1976); United States
v. 201.19 Acres of Land, 478 F.2d 1042 (9th Cir. 1973).
87. See cases cited supra note 86.
88. United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 333 (1949).
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value due to the regulation to the government may be unwarranted in this
context.8 9
II. THE EXISTING STATUTORY COMPENSATION SCHEMES
In addition to the constitutional "taking" rationale for compensating
submitters of data to support product regulations, various policy reasons
exist for compensating data submitters. Congress has addressed the need to
compensate data submitters in several federal regulations requiring submis-
sion of data to obtain a registration for a productP9 Since competing policy
considerations exist for mitigating the effects of a regulation on a particular
industry, no regulation concerning data submission and compensation has
presented a concise, predictable approach to compensation. While legislative
histories speak of the equitable goals of sharing costs and preventing "free
rider" problems, for example, the statutory schemes often affect the regu-
lated industry, either consciously or accidently, by promoting innovation
incentives or competition.9 ' This section examines the three existing statutory
approaches to compensation-exclusive use, mandatory compensation, and
no compensation-and discusses how each manages the competing policy
interests.
A. Exclusive Use Under FIFRA
FIFRA is the only current statutory program requiring the submission of
data to obtain a product registration that provides data submitters with the
protection of an exclusive use period.9 2 The Federal Environmental Pesticide
Control Act of 1972 amended FIFRA by requiring the EPA to determine
that a product for which a registration is sought will not cause "unreasonable
adverse effects on the environment. '93 Under the amendments, a manufac-
turer seeking to register a product may satisfy the data reporting requirements
by submitting either "a full description of the tests made and the results
thereof upon which the claims are based, or alternately a citation to data
that appear in the public literature or that previously had been submitted."9'
Although health and safety data may be disclosed to the public upon request,
a competing manufacturer may not rely on data already in the possession
89. See infra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
90. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c) (1982) (FIFRA); 15 U.S.C. § 2603(c) (1982) (TSCA). In discussing
the rationale of Congress in devising a data use scheme, the Monsanto Court recognized the
validity of using data on hand to support a subsequent registration "upon payment of com-
pensation" to the original submitter. 104 S. Ct. at 2879.
91. See infra text accompanying notes 135-58.
92. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(D)(i) (1982).
93. See 1972 Amendments, supra note 45.
94. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(D) (1982).
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of the EPA to support an application to register a product identical to one
previously registered unless the subsequent manufacturer obtains the per-
mission of the first manufacturer. If permission is denied, the subsequent
applicant must either wait the exclusive use period of ten years from the
date of the original application or develop adequate health and safety data
on its own.95
The exclusive use period effectively protects the original data submitter
from competition since the original submitter has little economic incentive
to give its permission to a subsequent applicant if the product is profitable.96
The original manufacturer will take advantage of this monopoly situation
either "by refusing to sell its data or by exacting a cost of entry which
would approximate the value of a monopoly. ' 97 This exclusive use protection
is in addition to any protection from competition the original manufacturer
may receive from patenting the product or the manufacturing process.9 8 It
also goes beyond the protection of formula and process trade secrets which
is retained in the data reporting statutes.99 Since the additional protection
given by an exclusive use provision goes only to the manufacturer who
developed the data first, it is necessary to ask whether such first development,
in the words of Thomas Jefferson, is one of "the things which are worth
to the public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent." °
The monopoly protection which results from the exclusive use period is
likely to cost society more than is necessary to further the policy of main-
taining incentives to innovation. An exclusive use period not only protects
preexisting incentives to innovation, it creates an additional incentive. During
the monopoly period, the original data submitter will maximize profits in
the way of all monopolists: by restricting output and charging a higher price
than could be maintained under competition. 0' As an author discussing the
possibility of extending the exclusive use period to drug marketing has said,
"[i]t is unlikely that such a price would reflect either the innovation's value
to society, its cost to the firm, or the desirability or necessity of erecting
sufficient protection to induce private investment."'' 0 2 The exclusive use pe-
95. Id. § 136a(c)(1)(D)(i).
96. But see 49 Fed. Reg. 30888 (1984).
97. REVIEW PANEL, supra note 14, at 58.
98. See supra text accompanying note 18.
99. See supra text accompanying note 8.
100. Quoted in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1966). As the first Secretary
of State, Thomas Jefferson was also the first administrator of the United States Patent Office.
101. See generally E. MANSFIELD, MICROECONoMIcs 277-310 (1970); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 41 (1976). The extent of monopolistic profits would, of course, depend on
the number and quality of substitutes in the market. A monopoly would result only when there
are no or few products available to compete with the monopolistic product.
102. REVIEW PANEL, supra note 14, at 58.
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riod may, therefore, affect the pesticide market to an extent unexpected by
Congress. 103
In addition to being anticompetitive and causing monopoly profits, an
exclusive use scheme results in duplicative testing of products by those
companies unwilling to wait until the end of the protective period to market
a product. Several problems exist with duplicative testing. First, duplicative
testing increases the risk of exposure to products which, although approved
for marketing, may be potentially dangerous under test conditions. This is
an even greater problem when the test rule requires reporting the results of
human exposures.' ° Second, it is economically inefficient to require the same
tests for identical products. 05 This aspect of the exclusive use period is
actually a disincentive to innovation since duplication of tests diverts limited
research funds from being spent on development of new products to the
inefficient duplication of tests that have already been completed."16 Although
duplicative testing does serve as a check on preexisting data, 0 7 it is not clear
that such a check is necessary for all products upon which tests have been
completed. 08 A more efficient system for gathering additional information
on a product would be to authorize the regulatory agency to require addi-
tional data on a chemical or pesticide when it finds that the existing data
are insufficient. Such authority exists currently under both FIFRA and
TSCA. 0 9
103. During congressional debate, the proposed exclusive use period was opposed by Acting
Attorney General Kleindeist. See S. REP. No. 92-970, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in
1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3993, 4097 ("Duplication of such tests is a waste to the
economy and a needless and undesirable burden on any subsequent applicant."); S. REP. No.
92-970, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3993,
4043 ("The effect of this provision is to afford additional economic protection, foster monopoly,
and it may tend to restrict pesticide business to large manufacturers. In addition, it would
increase not only federal administrative costs, but those of the manufacturers as well, aside
from unnecessarily increasing the application time."); S. REP. No. 92-970, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3993, 4096 ("As patent protection is
granted to a substantial number of pesticides, this provision of the Bill imposes requirements
on subsequent producers beyond the licensing fees that a patent holder may require."). The
exclusive use provision was retained in the 1978 amendments as a result of a compromise. See
Safir & Reagan, Data Use and Compensation Under FIFRA, 14 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L.
INST.) 10055, 10058 (1984).
104. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 3550)(1) (1982).
105. See R. POSNER, supra note 101, at 10 ("The terms 'value' and 'efficiency' are technical
terms. 'Efficiency' means exploiting economic resources in such a way that 'value'-human
satisfaction as measured by aggregate consumer willingness to pay for goods and services-is
maximized.").
106. See S. REP. No. 92-970, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 3993, 4096.
107. Safir & Reagan, supra note 103, at 10057.
108. If manufacturers knew the tests would be replicated, perhaps they would be less cautious
in preparing the original data.
109. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(2)(B) (1982) (FIFRA); 15 U.S.C. § 2603(a) (1982) (TSCA).
[Vol. 61:189
HEALTH AND SAFETY DATA
A fundamental theoretical difficulty exists, apart from the foregoing policy
reasons, in awarding an exclusive use to a manufacturer simply because it
develops the data to obtain a registration first. The Constitution gives Con-
gress the power "to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries." '"10 Congress has statutorily limited
patent protection to inventions that are new,"' useful"
2 and unobvious." 3
Similarly, copyright protection, although less demanding than patent pro-
tection, is limited to "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression."" 4 A copyright protects an author's expression but
not his ideas or discoveries." 5 Facts and historical events are not protectible
since "the discoverer merely finds and records. He may not claim that the
facts are 'original' with him."" 6 The main purpose of both patent and
copyright law is to get information and ideas to the public; the exclusive
use they provide is simply the means to effectuate that purpose.
An exclusive use period for data is not awarded because the data are new,
useful, unobvious or original, but because the company submitting the data
to support a product registration developed the data before its competitors.
In fact, the data must be uniformly derived to satisfy the testing requirements
of the registration statute.'' 7 If the product for which data is produced is
new, useful and unobvious, then the originator of the product may obtain
a patent in order to prevent others from making, using or selling that product
110. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
111. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
112. Id. § 102.
113. Id. § 103 ("A patent may not be obtained [if] the subject matter as a whole would
have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the
art to which said subject matter pertains.").
114. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982). See also Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S.
239, 250 (1902) ("There is a very broad distinction between what is implied in the word 'author,'
found in the Constitution, and the word 'inventor'. The latter carries an implication which
excludes the results of only ordinary skill, while nothing of this is necessarily involved in the
former.").
115. Shipley & Hay, Protecting Research: Copyright, Common Law Alternatives and Federal
Preemption, 63 N.C.L. REv. 125, 125 (1984).
116. J.M. NIAMER, NrMMER ON CoPYuGH § 2.03[E] (1985). A 1950 case in the Seventh
Circuit protected an author's collection of facts by upholding an action for copyright infringe-
ment. In Toksvig v. Bruce Publishing Co., 181 F.2d 664, 669 (7th Cir. 1950), the Seventh
Circuit said, "[t]he question is not whether Hubbard could have obtained the same information
by going to the same sources, but rather did she go to the same sources and do her own
independent research?" Toksvig has been relied on to support the principle that facts are
protectible under copyright law. See, e.g., Holdredge v. Knight Publishing Corp., 214 F. Supp.
921 (S.D. Cal. 1963). Most courts, however, have rejected Toksvig. See, e.g., Harper and Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds,
53 U.S.L.W. 4562 (1985); Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981);
Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980); Rosemont Enter., Inc.
v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
117. See, e.g., 92 Stat. 842 (1978).
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for seventeen years. To give exclusive use protection to data submitters or
other persons who are neither authors nor inventors, however, may be beyond
Congress's power under the patent clause of the Constitution.
Some critics view the exclusive use period as the only compensation scheme
capable of adequately compensating the original data submitter for its lost
profits." 8 This view, however, assumes the propriety of awarding monopoly
profits to the first manufacturer to obtain a registration for a product. It
fails to consider that the only reason the original data submitter gains
monopoly profits in the first place is because the data reporting regulation
created the competitive advantage for first submitters. Subsequent applicants
have no additional advantage in the market than they did before the reporting
requirement. To market the product, the subsequent applicant must still
develop the product formulae and manufacturing processes that make pro-
duction feasible or, if the originator has obtained a patent on either the
manufacturing processes or formulae, must wait the period of the patent
before marketing the product."19 While the advantage of an exclusive use
may rise to the status of an entitlement, the denial of which requires certain
due process protection, 20 it is not an advantage that is necessary to replace
a monopoly right that has been taken away.
Another argument is that an exclusive use period is necessary to protect
innovation because the patent system inadequately protects the innovation
incentives of chemical substance manufacturers.' 2' There are two problems
with the patent system which are unique to chemical and drug manufacturers.
The first problem is that the time it takes to conduct health and safety
testing cuts into the effective protection provided by a patent. The second
problem, independent of the reporting requirement, is that some valuable
chemical innovations are unpatentable because they fail to meet the statutory
requirements of being new, novel and unobvious.
A manufacturer will usually obtain a patent on a product before it begins
developing health and safety data to register the product. 2 2 If the manu-
facturer is able to obtain a patent, it will be able to exclude others from
making, using, or selling the patented product for a guaranteed period of
seventeen years. 123 If the product or the process of manufacturing the product
fails to meet the requirements of patentability, any information which is
revealed to the patent office during the patent process remains secret. 24 After
118. McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 7, at 880 n.238.
119. See supra text accompanying note 8. The originator also receives the substantial economic
benefit of being the first manufacturer in the market. See McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 7,
at 852.
120. Safir & Reagan, supra note 103, at 10061.
121. See, e.g., McGarity & Shaprio, supra note 7, at 850-51.
122. See Gannon, supra note 63, at 594 n.7.
123. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1982).
124. Id. § 122.
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a manufacturer obtains a patent, it must still obtain a registration in order
to market the product in the United States. The manufacturer must develop
and submit the required data, and wait until the data is processed by the
appropriate regulatory agency. 25 Experts estimate that the effective period
of patent protection is twelve years for pesticides 26 and ten years for drugs. 27
Little information exists, however, to determine the extent of the impact
of a shorter period of effective patent protection on the incentives to innovate
in the industry. The term of patent protection is determined primarily by
historical precedent rather than by scientific or economic calculation of the
best period to encourage innovation. 28 Nothing is theoretically wrong, there-
fore, with extending the period of patent protection for those products subject
to a regulation which delays their release in the market. 29 This would be
the solution to the innovation problem most rationally related to existing
innovation incentives. Before such a change is made, however, more infor-
mation on the effect of the regulations on innovation is necessary.
Incentives to innovation are also lessened because obtaining patent pro-
tection for a chemical or drug is more difficult than for other products. In
order to be patentable, an invention must satisfy the statutory requirements
of novelty, utility and unobviousness. a0 It is the unobviousness requirement
which presents special problems for chemical products.
Section 103 of the patent statute requires that a chemical compound be
unobvious "as a whole" over the prior art. 31 Often, however, a new chemical
will be similar in structure to other chemicals already known to the public.
Since one of the policies of the patent law is to prevent products previously
known to the public from being taken from the public domain by the granting
of a patent, these chemicals are not patentable. This "structural obviousness"
often precludes an inventor from obtaining a patent on a chemical compound
no matter how useful it is to society. 3 2 Several courts have surmounted this
difficulty with the idea of "relative significance."'' 3 3 Unlike other approaches
to the unobviousness issue, "relative significance" focuses on the social and
commercial uses of the chemical compound. If the uses of the new compound
are more significant than what would have been expected from reference to
structurally similar chemicals, then the compound is patentable. The theory
125. See Davies, supra note 9, at 52.
126. Gannon, supra note 63, at 594 n.7.
127. See REviEw PANEL, supra note 13, at 31 n.100.
128. See R. CHOATE & W. FRANCIS, PATENT LAW 82-83 (1983).
129. At present, a different statutory length applies to design patents-14 years-than to
other patents-17 years. 35 U.S.C. § 173 (1982).
130. See supra text accompanying notes 95-97.
131. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1982).
132. See Blodgett, Relative Significance-A Concept in Chemical Structural Obviousness
Cases, 63 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 69, 70 (1981); Marquis, An Economic Analysis of the Patentability
of Chemical Compounds, 63 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 3, 4 (1981).
133. See generally Blodgett, supra note 132.
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of "relative significance" reflects the policy that "[t]he inventor of the
universal cancer cure should not be denied effective patent protection because
his compound is structurally similar to a compound known to be useful only
as ballast for ships."' 3 4 To the extent that health and safety regulations
affect the incentives to innovation in the industry, it may be incumbent on
Congress to amend the patent statute to account for the special circumstances
in the industry.
B. The Just Compensation Schemes of FIFRA and TSCA
Providing an additional incentive to innovation through the statutory
compensation mechanisms may not be as appropriate a goal as protecting
against registration requirements which create disincentives for companies
to develop new and innovative products. To prevent these disincentives, the
cost of developing sufficient health and safety data must not act as a sanction
which is imposed only on the first manufacturer to register a product. Both
FIFRA and TSCA provide for the payment of "just compensation" by
subsequent manufacturers to the original submitter and any prior manufac-
turers that have paid compensation.' 35 In their present form, however, both
compensation schemes leave the question of what exactly is to be considered
for compensation purposes to an arbitrator or the courts. The guidance
which Congress and the EPA have given these adjudicatory bodies is in-
consistent since it simultaneously promotes the policies of providing new
innovation incentives, maintaining existing innovation incentives, forcing cost
sharing, and encouraging competition. Providing for a just compensation
mechanism does not end the inquiry as to what policies such a program
should promote.
1. Compensation Under FIFRA
After the exclusive use period under FIFRA, a manufacturer is protected
through fifteen years after the original date of data submission by the
requirement that any subsequent applicant must "offer to compensate" the
original data submitter.'3 6 The terms and amount of the compensation are
to be determined by agreement of the parties, or, if an agreement cannot
be reached, by binding arbitration. 37 The 1978 amendment provides that
"[t]he findings and determination of the arbitrator shall be final and con-
clusive, and no official or court of the United States shall have power or
jurisdiction to review any such findings and determination, except for fraud,
134. Id. at 74.
135. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(D)(ii) (1982) (FIFRA); 15 U.S.C. § 2603(c)(4)(A) (1982) (TSCA).
136. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(D)(ii) (1982).
137. Id.
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misrepresentation, or other misconduct by one of the parties."' 3 8 The amend-
ment provides no basis by which the arbitrator may determine the appropriate
amount of compensation, and the EPA has made clear its intention not to
provide guidelines for determining the appropriate amount of compensa-
tion.3 9 Instead, the EPA has left the determination of appropriateness to
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service ("FMCS"), which has au-
thority to manage arbitration pursuant to the Act. 40 Although the FMCS
has provided for the arbitration procedures,"4 it has not provided guidelines
respecting how compensation is to be determined.
The EPA did issue a proposed amendment to Title 21 of the Code of
Federal Regulations in 1977 concerning the approach to compensation that
the administrator would use under the 1972 compensation system."4 2 A final
rule was never issued, presumably because the EPA believed it was unnec-
essary after the 1978 amendment to FIFRA. Section 162.9(h) of the proposed
amendment provided that the Administrator or an administrative law judge
could determine a reasonable amount of compensation provided that certain
procedural steps had been met. Section 162.9(i) would have given the Ad-
ministrator or the administrative law judge the freedom to base their decision
on what they found "reasonable under the circumstances, equitable to the
parties and permitted by the law.' ' 43 It also provided that they "might
consider any factors relevant to this determination." ''44 Realizing that the
section provided little guidance for determining a dollar amount for any
particular compensation award, the EPA specifically requested suggestions
for a "precise formula" for determining compensation and for "comment
regarding the factors appropriate to this determination. 1 4
No reference exists in the public record as to the scope of the comments
received. The broad range of opinion as to the purpose of a compensation
scheme can, however, be seen in some of the "factors" which had previously
been suggested and therefore set out in the proposed rule. While the "actual
138. Id. The constitutionality under article III of this limited review was upheld recently in
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prods. Co., 105 S. Ct. 3325 (1985). Between 1972 and
1978, the amount of compensation awarded was to be determined by the EPA Administrator
and was subject to judicial review.
139. 44 Fed. Reg. 27,945 (1979) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 162).
140. Id. at 27,949.
141. See 45 Fed. Reg. 55,394 (enacting procedure for appointing arbitrator, 29 C.F.R. §
1440.1(28) (1980)). The rule also established that "[t]he claimant shall have the burden of going
forward to establish his entitlement to an amount of compensation [by a] preponderance of
the evidence." 45 Fed. Reg. 55,394. See also 44 Fed. Reg. 43,292, 43,293 (1979) (to be codified
at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1440) (proposed July 24, 1979). ("Congress has demonstrated its belief that
the costs of generating information to evaluate pesticide risk be equally apportioned .... ").
142. EPA, 42 Fed. Reg. 31,284, 31,286 (1977) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 162 & 173)
(proposed June 20, 1977).
143. Id. at 31,285.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 31,286.
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cost" of developing the data was the first factor mentioned, the comments
on the proposed rule listed ten other factors, including 1) the "current cost
of duplicating the data"; 2) "the estimated effect of the amount and method
of compensation on research and development of pesticides"; 3) "the fore-
seeable nature, extent and profitability from marketing"; 4) "the ability of
the applicant to pay compensation"; and, 5) "the extent to which the
claimant has recovered, and/or may recover, his investment in the data by
sale of the pesticide."' 46 While the first and second of these factors promote
the policies of preserving or creating innovation incentives, the third and
fourth factors clearly would increase the amount of competition in the
industry. Since conflicting policies are promoted by each of these factors,
the effect that the data reporting requirement of FIFRA would have had
on the pesticide industry is unclear.' 47
2. Compensation Under TSCA
The TSCA requires producers of chemicals to obtain a registration with
the EPA to market each chemical in the United States. 48 In order to obtain
a registration, a manufacturer must show that the chemical does not "present
an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment."' 49 Like FIFRA,
however, TSCA allows the EPA Administrator to grant an applicant an
exemption from the testing requirements if the chemical substance for which
registration is sought is identical to a previously registered substance and
submission of additional data would be duplicative of other data previously
submitted. 50 The original submitter may demand payment of a "fair and
equitable" reimbursement from any subsequent manufacturer that relies on
its data to obtain a product registration.' 5'
The regulations implementing the reimbursement scheme under TSCA
assume that parties will arrange either to share the initial burden of devel-
oping health and safety data, or to share the costs once they are incurred.
If the parties cannot agree, then either party may request that the Admin-
istrator of the EPA issue a reimbursement order.'2 2 The EPA has instituted
a system, similar to commercial arbitration, of using hearing officers to
adjudicate disputes. The Administrator reviews the arbitration and issues a
146. Id.
147.. In a recent statement, the EPA said, "Congress did not intend, however, that a scheme
for compensation should function to exclude new products and producers from the market-
place." 49 Fed. Reg. 30,889 (1984).
148. 15 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1) (1982). Under TSCA, data on health and safety are required
for new and old chemicals. TSCA explicitly does not apply to pesticides. Id. § 2602(2)(B)(ii).
149. Id. § 2603(a).
150. Id. § 2603(c).
151. Id. § 2603(c)(4)(A).
152. 48 Fed. Reg. 31,787 (1983).
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reimbursement order, basing his decision "on the record of the hearing,
upon the petitions for review, and on written briefs and oral arguments if
they are necessary."' 53 The statute provides that any order by the Admin-
istrator may be reviewed by a federal court.'
54
Unlike FIFRA, TSCA provides some guidelines as to what elements should
be considered when determining the amount of a "fair and equitable"
reimbursement. The Act directs the EPA to "consider all relevant factors,
including the effect on the competitive position of the person required to
provide reimbursement in relation to the person to be reimbursed and the
share of the market for such substance or mixture of the person required
to provide reimbursement in relation to the share of the market of the
persons to be reimbursed."' 55 Although this scheme provides some indication
to congressional intent, both competitive position and market share are
difficult to ascertain.
The EPA has said that neither it nor any commenter was able to reduce
"competitive position ... to a quantitative measure."'' 56 The language of
the statute is unclear regarding whether the "effect" which is to be corrected
by considering competitive position is an unwarranted competitive advantage
or an impediment to competition. The EPA believes the provision was
intended to protect small businesses.' 5 7 Why specific reference to small busi-
nesses was not provided in the legislation is unclear. If one of the goals of
the reimbursement program was to protect small business, then businesses
under a certain size could have been exempted from paying compensation
altogether.
Market share is an even less helpful guideline for determining compen-
sation. For the thousands of chemicals already on the market at the time
TSCA was enacted, market share appears to be an equitable way to determine
the amount any particular company should pay for testing.' 58 A manufacturer
seeking to register a new product has, however, no market at the time of
applying for a registration to market a product. Market share would therefore
be inappropriate in most situations.
Since the determination of what is an appropriate compensation under
both FIFRA and TSCA depends on the view of the arbitrator or the Ad-
ministrator, the likelihood either compensation program can consistently
promote either an incentive-producing or competition-promoting policy is
153. Id.
154. 15 U.S.C. § 2603(c)(3)(A) (1982).
155. Id.
156. 48 Fed. Reg. 31,788 (1983).
157. Id. See also H.R. REP. No. 94-1341, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1976).
158. The EPA has decided to measure market share in terms of "production volume." 48
Fed. Reg. 31,788 (1983). The major difficulty of using production volume for cost apportionment
purposes is that that information may itself be considered valuable commercial information by
the companies.
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minimal. This situation is not simply the result of the EPA's failure to
promulgate a precise formula. For Congress, having given the EPA little
guidance, conflicting guidance, or no guidance at all, to expect the EPA to
develop a specific program to mitigate the impact of a regulatory program
on an industry is to expect too much. A more rational approach to com-
pensation would be for the EPA to develop a cost-sharing scheme for the
present so that the cost of developing data will not fall only on the company
that first seeks to market a product. Congress can develop incentives to
promote innovation or competition as may prove necessary after evidence
accumulates about the effect of the regulatory scheme on the affected in-
dustry. Although industry may be reluctant to release information regarding
the impact of a regulation, the industry should have the burden of proving
the necessity of an innovation-inducing or competition-promoting scheme
since the information is in their hands.
C. Data Reporting Regulations Which Provide No Compensation
The Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") administers several programs
requiring data to be submitted to support a product registration. For new
drug,5 9 new animal drug, 6 1 and medical device1 6' registrations, health and
safety data are explicitly protected. In place of disclosure, the agency makes
available summaries of the data. For food additives,162 color additives,' 63
biological products,' 61 and antibiotics,6 5 no scheme exists to protect health
and safety data submitted to support a product registration. For food and
color additives, data may be released to the public once a regulation is
proposed. 6  For antibiotics and biological products, data may be released
as soon as the registration of the product is approved. 61 Each product
registration program, however, exempts from disclosure "manufacturing
methods or processes, including quality control processes." 6 Each program
also anticipates that data disclosure may be particularly harmful to some
data submitters and therefore provides that disclosure is permissible "unless
extraordinary circumstances are shown.' 69
159. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)-(4) (1982); see 21 U.S.C. § 321(p) (1982) (definition).
160. 21 U.S.C. § 360b(a)(1) (1982).
161. 21 U.S.C. § 360j(h)(1)-(3) (1982).
162. 21 U.S.C. § 348 (1982); see 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (1982) (definition).
163. 21 U.S.C. § 376 (1982); see 21 U.S.C. § 321(t)(1) (1982) (definition).
164. 42 U.S.C. § 262(a) (1982).
165. 21 U.S.C. § 357; see 21 U.S.C. § 357(a) (1982) (definition).
166. 21 C.F.R. § 71.1(c) (1985) (color additives); 21 C.F.R. § 171.1(h) (1985) (food additives).
167. 21 C.F.R. § 431.71(e), (f) (1985) (antibiotics); 21 C.F.R. § 601.51(e) (1985) (biological
products).
168. See supra text accompanying note 15.
169. 21 C.F.R. § 71.15(a) (1985) (color additives); 21 C.F.R. § 171.1 (h)(1) (1985) (food
additives); 21 C.F.R. § 431.71(e) (1985) (antibiotics); 21 C.F.R. § 601.51(e)(l) (1985) (biological
products).
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Although these statutory schemes provide no compensation to submitters
of data, they have never been challenged in court. This may be because
health and safety data in these areas have traditionally been disclosed through
publication anyway. As the FDA has noted, "the safety, functionality, and
effectiveness data contained in food and color additive petitions and anti-
biotic drug forms have no trade secret value and, since they are often
published in scientific journals or given to customers or scientists or disclosed
to the public in other ways, are not customarily regarded as privileged." 17°
Thinking of health and safety data as being in the public domain is
consistent with the American system of open scientific debate.1'7 Research
builds upon previous research, leading eventually to a comprehensive un-
derstanding of a subject area. Although there may be economic and political
reasons why health and safety data are disclosed in some circumstances and
not others, there is no difference that can be linked to the nature of the
data. 172
The open disclosure regulations place an unfair burden on the first man-
ufacturer that wishes to market a product. The government can constitu-
tionally use and disclose the data without compensation after Monsanto since
it has given submitters no basis on which to form a reasonable investment-
backed expectation. Like the FIFRA and TSCA scheme, however, a program
to distribute the costs of developing health and safety data among product
registrants is fair since some costs would probably have been passed to all
registrants in the form of a fee had the government developed the information
itself. The following section suggests a program that has as its foundation
the policy that costs should be shared equally by all manufacturers of a
product.
III. AN APPROACH TO COST SHARING
A cost-sharing scheme is the compensation approach that is most consistent
with general notions of fairness. 73 Disclosing data to the general public can
be justified as promoting the health and safety of the public. The cost of
health and safety data should be viewed as an inevitable cost of doing
business in a society which is concerned about the health and safety of its
170. 39 Fed. Reg. 44,602, 44,632 (1974).
171. "The cause of knowledge is best served when history is the common property of all,
and each generation remains free to draw upon the discoveries and insights of the past."
Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
841 (1980).
172. The distinction is not, as the FDA has said, simply that new drug, new animal drug,
and medical device notices "result in private licenses rather than in public regulations." 39
Fed. Reg. 44,633 (1974). Whether the word "license" is used makes no difference for the effect
of the regulation. See also Safir & Reagan, supra note 103, at 10062.
173. See Michelman, supra note 15, at 1171.
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citizens. 74 The EPA's use of data to register a product which will compete
with a product already on the market is not as easy to justify. Allowing the
subsequent applicant to receive a benefit by not having to pay for data
simply because data have already been developed by a competitor is unfair
for several reasons. First, the subsequent submitter has done nothing to
deserve the benefit. The subsequent applicant, in fact, may be less deserving
of any benefit than the original applicant, since the subsequent applicant
probably has knowledge from the market history about the commercial
potential of the product. The subsequent applicant can, therefore, avoid
risks more easily than the original submitter. 75 The second inequity in the
data use provision is that the first applicant has "paid" by doing the required
testing while any subsequent applicant has not. Even if the original applicant
had no expectation of receiving compensation when it first developed its
data to support an application so that compensation in no way serves as an
incentive to innovation, it is unfair for the subsequent applicant to be
enriched at the expense of the former.
A workable cost-sharing system is possible only if the word "share" is
used in its normal sense: equal benefit, equal cost. By requiring a second
applicant to pay exactly half the costs of developing health and safety data
on a product, the originator will be reimbursed and the subsequent applicant
will be required to share costs. If a third applicant wished to rely on the
data, that applicant would have to pay each of the prior applicants one-
sixth of the total cost. 76 While an arbitrary date may still be set after which
no payment of compensation would be required, at some point the cost of
initiating proceedings to obtain compensation will likely be greater than the
benefit gained by compensation. At that point, no prior applicant would
pursue an action for compensation, and the data would truly be in the public
domain.
This approach to compensation has a number of advantages over any
scheme that relies on market share or that mixes economic incentives with
cost-sharing. First, the amount of compensation could be ascertainable at
the time any subsequent application is made. If the cost of developing the
data is submitted along with the data, and some guidance as to the reasonable
cost of the test requested is provided, the subsequent applicant would be on
notice as to the approximate cost of obtaining a registration for a product.
Second, it is a mechanism for determining compensation which is totally
174. See supra text accompanying note 2.
175. To the extent that the cost of producing health and safety data makes taking the risk
of marketing a product a less viable option, companies may be less willing to market new
products.
176. The formula for determining the amount that a subsequent applicant must pay each
former applicant is 1/n(n-1), where "n" equals the number of companies marketing the product,
including the present applicant.
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free of implicit assumptions about the proper policy to correctly affect the
economic structure of the regulated industry. Paying half of what it costs
to develop data may be too much for smaller manufacturers, but it is at
most half as much as they would have had to pay if they had been required
to develop the data themselves. The costs of lengthy arbitration are also
eliminated. Third, it is a scheme that compensates the original data submitter
for any royalty it might have received from marketing the data. In this
sense, it most closely resembles the compensation that the original submitter
would have obtained in a non-monoply situation. Finally, a proportional
cost-sharing program would be relatively easy to administer. Little difficulty
would exist in determining the market share of a product for any particular
manufacturer. The mathematical calculations involved would be elementary.
While there may be questions as to the validity of items included in the cost
calculations, they would be questions which are familiar to arbitrators and
judges. 77 The appropriate regulatory agency could provide guidance on how
to determine such issues as the appropriate amount of fixed costs to be
included and the extent to which it is appropriate to compensate for data
which goes beyond the requirements of the particular regulation.
IV. CONCLUSION
The federal government should continue to regulate industry as long as
the health and safety of the public is threatened. For chemicals and other
potentially dangerous products, adequate data on the health and safety of
the product are necessary for customers to make truly informed decisions
and for the public to know whether the social benefits of the product
outweigh any potential risks. Health and safety data, as important to society
as other information about the product, should be developed before the
product is marketed. While the government may place the burden of de-
veloping such information on the industry marketing the product, it would
be unfair if the burden is not shared equally by all manufacturers producing
the product. Programs designed to compensate for the market effect of
regulations should be sufficiently detailed so that the program remains true
to the policies intended by the legislature.
ERic E. BoYD
177. See, e.g., 48 Fed. Reg. 31,787, 31,789 (1983) (EPA regulation providing that under
TSCA, "a portion of fixed costs, including rent, equipment, and salaries, should be eligible
for reimbursement.").
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